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United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (at podium) briefs the press following his meeting with 
Turkish Cypriot leader Derviş Eroğlu (right) and Dimitris Christofias (left of Mr Ban), President of Cyprus, in 
Geneva, Switzerland, 26 January 2011 (UN Photo by Eskinder Debebe, licensed through Fair Use policy).  
ABSTRACT 
In 2011 Turkish officials began indicating their intention to suspend all contact with Cyprus’s presidency 
of  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  (EU),  slated  for  the  second  half  of  2012,  given  the  issues 
surrounding the unresolved Cyprus conflict. This came as the latest development in a long and arduous 
path of Turkey’s application for EU membership that began in 1987. This paper provides the context – 
the  Cyprus  conflict,  Turkey’s  EU  accession  negotiations,  and  the  Cyprus  reunification  talks  –  in 
understanding the reasons and consequences of Ankara’s boycott of the Cyprus presidency. The article 
also considers the evolving nature and the role of the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, 
especially after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and how this may have played into Turkey’s 
calculations in calling for the boycott.  
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Introduction  
 
In  2011  when  Turkish  leaders  and  officials  began 
indicating  their  intention  to  suspend  all  contact  with 
Cyprus’s  presidency  of  the  Council  of  the  European 
Union, slated for the second half of 2012, it seemed 
that  yet  another  clash  in  the  thorny  history  of  EU-
Turkey  relations  had  brewed  up.  While  it  is  widely 
known that the Cyprus conflict is the cause behind the 
decision, the intricate issues connecting Turkey, Cyprus 
and the EU are less well understood. Media reportage 
of the boycott, often bordering on the sensational, has 
offered  little  explanation  of  what  a  boycott  of  the 
rotating presidency of the Council really means.    
 
This  article  explores  the  possible  reasons  and 
motivations  behind  Turkey’s  decision  to  boycott  the 
Cyprus EU presidency and what this entails, especially 
in view of the institutional changes to the EU provided 
for  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  It  will  also  tease  out  the 
intertwined  connections  that  the  decision  of  boycott 
has  with  Turkey’s  EU  accession  negotiations  and  the 
settlement of the Cyprus conflict through reunification 
talks. 
 
The article begins by tracing the series of events since 
July  2011,  through  media  reports,  in  which  Turkish 
officials  had  indicated  their  intention  to  boycott  the 
Cyprus  presidency.  The  historical  background  of  the 
Cyprus  conflict  is  then  recounted,  followed  by  a 
discussion  of  the  effect  of  the  Cyprus  conflict  on 
Turkey’s  EU  accession  negotiations  and  an  outline  of 
the Cyprus reunification talks, both issues of which are 
intrinsic to Turkey’s decision to boycott. The evolving 
role of the Council of the European Union, the rotating 
presidency, and the enlargement agenda of the Cyprus 
presidency are examined to provide an understanding 
of what Turkey’s boycott entails. An analysis of these 
                                                      
1 Loke Hoe Yeong is Researcher / Policy and Programme 
Executive at the European Union Centre in Singapore. 
(correspondence email: euclhy@nus.edu.sg). The author 
wishes to thank Yeo Lay Hwee and Barnard Turner for their 
comments on the paper, and Olivia Gippner for sharing her 
insights. The usual disclaimers apply.   
issues aims to account for the strategy behind Turkey’s 
decision, and to speculate on the consequences of it.  
 
Turkey: signalling boycott of the Cyprus Presidency of 
the Council of the EU 
 
The  first  mention  in  the  media  of  the  possibility  of 
Ankara freezing ties with the Cyprus EU presidency was 
made  by  the  Turkish  Minister  for  EU  Affairs  Egemen 
Bağış on 13 July 2011.
2 However, this could be seen as 
somewhat  belated  or  as  a  consequence  of  current 
events; the decision on the order of rotation of the 
Council presidency for the 2007-2020 period was made 
back on 1 January 2007 by the Council of the European 
Union under the German presidency,
3 but there is no 
record then of Turkey raising its discontentment at the 
prospect of Cyprus assuming the EU presidency for the 
July to December 2012 period.  
 
Just  days  earlier,  the  Turkish  Cypriot  leader  Derviş 
Eroğlu,  generally  considered  a  hardliner  on  issues 
surrounding the resolution of the Cyprus conflict, said 
he sought to hold the EU presidency as a unified Cyprus 
by 2012, and called for the talks to be concluded within 
three to five months to reach an agreement.
4 This was 
also Ankara’s position up to this point.  When making 
his  comments,  Bağış  appeared  to  be  clarifying  what 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said earlier, 
that ‘if the Greek Cypriot side stalls negotiations and 
takes over the presidency of the European Union in July 
2012, this means not only a deadlock on the island, but 
also  a  blockage,  a  freezing  point  in  Turkey-European 
Union  relations’.  Bağış  had  also  clarified  that  the 
suspension  of  relations  was  limited  to  the  EU 
presidency, and that relations would continue with the 
European Commission. Later in June 2012, Selim Yenel, 
Turkey's ambassador to the EU, further clarified that   
During  the  next  six  months,  we  will  continue  our 
relations with the European Commission, European 
Council,  European  Parliament  and  the  External 
Relations  Service  [sic]  […]  But  we  will  have  no 
relations with the presidency. If they will invite us to 
a meeting, if they are going to chair this meeting, or 
                                                      
2 EurActiv, ‘Turkey warns of freezing ties with Cyprus EU 
Presidency’, 14 July 2011.  
3 Official Journal of the European Union, Council Decision of 1 
January 2007 
determining the order in which the office of President of the 
Council shall be held (2007/5/EC, Euratom)  
4 Hürriyet Daily News, ‘Turkish Cypriots seek EU presidency in 
2012’, 5 July 2011.   EUC Working Paper No. 9 
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they  invite  us  to  a  meeting  in  their  part  of  the 
Cyprus, we will not participate at these meetings.
5 
 
The  remarks  from  the  Turkish  side  in  2011  were 
followed  by  a  similar  pronouncement  from  Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan while on a visit to 
northern Cyprus to mark the anniversary of the Turkish 
invasion of the island on 20 July 1974. Erdoğan told the 
Turkish  daily  Milliyet  that  ‘we  will  not  have  any 
discussions with the Cypriot president. Reports with the 
EU  will  be  frozen’.
6 His  remarks  drew  condemnation 
from Cypriot President Demetris Christofias, as well as 
a strong reaction from certain quarters of the EU such 
as  Andrew  Duff,  European  Parliament  member  and 
member  of  the  Parliament’s  EU-Turkey  Joint 
Parliamentary Committee, who expressed that he was 
appalled  at  the  ‘twist’  to  Turkey’s  policy  towards 
Cyprus.
7 
 
The issue was triggered again in September 2011 when 
Cyprus, with the help of the US-based energy company 
Noble Energy  which is 30 per cent owned by Israeli 
interests, started offshore drilling south of the island at 
Block 12 of the Aphrodite gas field ,  and discovered 
significant gas reserves. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan 
quickly  denounced  Cyprus  and  Israel  for  ‘oil  [sic] 
exploration  madness’.
8 Linking  it  with  the  stalemate 
surrounding  the  Cyprus  settlement  talks,  Turkish 
Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay was quoted in the 
media as saying that 
 
If  the  peace  negotiations  there  [Cyprus]  are  not 
conclusive, and the EU gives its rotating presidency 
to southern Cyprus, the real crisis will be between 
Turkey and the EU […] Because we will then freeze 
our  relations  with  the  EU.  We  have  made  this 
announcement, as a government we have made this 
decision. Our relations with the EU will come to a 
sudden halt.
9 
Meanwhile  a  spokesperson  for  the  EU  High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
Catherine Ashton affirmed that there were no plans to 
                                                      
5Deutsche Welle, ‘Turkey talks tough on Cyprus EU 
presidency’, 1 July 2012.  
6 EUbusiness, ‘Erdogan threatens freeze with EU during 
Cypriot presidency’, 19 July 2011.   
7 Andrew Duff MEP, website of, ‘Andrew Duff deplores set 
back on Cyprus’, 21 July 2011; Cyprus Mail, ‘Erdogan 
comments irk EU officials’, 22 July 2011.  
8 Reuters, ‘Turkish PM calls Cyprus, Israel drilling "madness”’, 
21 September 2011.  
9 Burch, Jonathon, ‘Turkey to freeze EU ties if Cyprus gets EU 
presidency’, Reuters, 18 September 2011.  
change the rotational schedule of the presidency of the 
Council.
10 Subsequently, the responses from the EU on 
the issue were couched in the language of imploring 
Turkey  to  ‘fully  respect  the  role  of  the  rotating 
presidency  of  the  council’  as  a  ‘fundamental 
institutional feature of the Union provided for in the 
Treaty’.
11 
 
Further  controversy  erupted  in  March  2012  when 
Egemen  Bağış  told  a  Turkish  Cypriot  newspaper  that 
Turkey  would  consider  annexing  northern  Cyprus  as 
‘one  of  several  outcomes’,  should  the  reunification 
talks fail.
12 Such threats of annexation have been made 
in the past, but Greek Cypriot officials have tended not 
to attach too much significance to them,
13 probably 
interpreting such threats as mere posturing. Besides 
drawing condemnation from the Greek Cypriots, the 
leader of the main opposition Republican Turks Party 
(CTP)  in  northern  Cyprus  said  the  idea  was 
unacceptable. 
 
In the weeks leading up to the start of the Cyprus 
presidency, Turkey reaffirmed its plan to cease contact 
with the EU presidency while maintaining ties with the 
other EU institutions. Again, Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu linked the decision to the lack of progress on 
Cyprus conflict talks.
14  
  
Background to the Cyprus conflict 
 
Cyprus  attained  its  independence  from  the  United 
Kingdom in 1960, after negotiations between the UK, 
Greece, Turkey and the representatives of the Greek 
Cypriot  and  Turkish  Cypriot  communities.  The 
negotiations resulted in the London-Zurich Agreements 
that  formed  the  basis  for  the  Constitution  of  the 
Republic  of  Cyprus.  Accompanying  them  were  the 
Treaty  of  Guarantee,  which  required  the  UK,  Greece 
and  Turkey  to  guarantee  the  independence  and 
                                                      
10 Reuters, ‘EU Commission wants Turkey, Cyprus to show 
restraint’, 19 September 2011.  
11European Council, European Council Conclusions, 9 
December 2011, EUCO 139/1/11, REV 1, CO EUR 24, 
Conclusion 6.   
12 EurActiv, ‘Turkey says it could annex northern Cyprus’, 5 
March 2012.  
13 See for instance, Tocci, Nathalie (2004) EU accession 
dynamics and conflict resolution: catalysing peace or 
consolidating partition in Cyprus? (Ashgate: Aldershot), p. 
103.   
14 Reuters, ‘Turkey sticks to boycott of Cyprus EU presidency’, 
7 June 2012.  EUC Working Paper No. 9 
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territorial  integrity  of  Cyprus,  including  the  right  of 
these  external  countries  to  the  use  of  force;
15 the 
Treaty of Alliance, signed between Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus to control the number of Greek and Turkish 
troops that could remain on the island; and the Treaty 
of Establishment, which provided for the UK to retain 
two sovereign base areas on the island.   
 
The Greek Cypriots, constituting 77 per cent of the 
island’s population, had largely been campaigning for 
enosis,  or  a  union  of  the  island  with  Greece.  Armed 
struggle led by EOKA (Greek abbreviation for ‘National 
Organisation  of  Cypriot  Fighters’)  since  1955  had 
caused  deadly  violence,  mostly  fought  against  the 
British  colonial  authorities,  and  later  with  Turkish 
Cypriot  armed  groups  that  were  formed  as  a 
counterweight  to  EOKA.  The  Turkish  Cypriots, 
constituting 18 per cent of the population,
16 were less 
unified  in  their  stance  on  status  of  Cyprus.  Some 
advocated taksim or partition of the island into the two 
ethnic communities upon independence, while others 
advocated some form of power-sharing arrangements 
between the two communities. Yet others advocated a 
‘double enosis’, in which the Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot parts of the island would be enjoined with their 
respective kin-states Greece and Turkey.   
 
In  1963  when  intercommunal  violence  broke  out  for 
the  first  time  since  independence,  the  power-sharing 
arrangements  of  the  constitution  of  the  Republic  of 
Cyprus  were  effectively  suspended  as  the  two 
communities  retreated  into  segregated  enclaves 
throughout the island. A year later, the United Nations 
established a peacekeeping force – the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) – to prevent 
any reoccurrence of violence.  
                                                      
15 Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee states that: ‘In the 
event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, 
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult 
together with respect to the representations or measures 
necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. / In so 
far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, 
each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to 
take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of 
affairs created by the present Treaty.’ While the right to the 
use of force is not explicitly stated, there is some consensus 
in legal opinion that it is justifiable subject to other 
conditions in the Treaty (see Hoffmeister, Frank [2009] 
Cyprus, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
section 22 and 23).   
16 The remaining 5 per cent of the island’s population 
consists of Armenians and Maronites; these figures are from 
the last census taken of the entire island, in 1960.    
When the military junta in Greece covertly supported 
the coup d'état to overthrow the Cypriot president in 
1974, Turkey cited its obligations under the Treaty of 
Guarantee  to  defend  the  Turkish  Cypriot  community 
and invaded Cyprus from the north. After the end of 
hostilities,  the  Turkish  armed  forces  held  on  to  the 
northern  one-third  of  the  island,  which  was  then 
separated  from  the  southern  part  by  the  UN-policed 
Green  Line.  Population  transfers  were  carried  out  as 
northern  Cyprus  became  the  enclave  for  Turkish 
Cypriots, and Greek Cypriots residing in the northern 
part  of  the  island  moved  south.  The  UNFICYP  was 
redeployed to patrol the buffer zone between the two 
parts  of  the  island,  which  it  continues  to  do  to  the 
present day.  
 
In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was 
unilaterally declared by the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf 
Denktaş, recognised only by Turkey.  
 
The Cyprus conflict and Turkey’s EU accession 
negotiations  
 
The Cyprus conflict has been intrinsic to the impasse in 
Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. At the heart of the 
matter lies the mutual non-recognition between Turkey 
and Cyprus. 
 
Greek Cypriots consider northern Cyprus to be under 
Turkish  military  occupation;  Ankara  refers  to  the 
internationally  recognised  Republic  of  Cyprus  as  the 
‘Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus’, and 
is  the  only  country  to  recognise  the  unilaterally 
declared  Turkish  Republic  of  Northern  Cyprus.  More 
recently, Turkey’s stance on the recognition issue has 
been  more  nuanced.  When  signing  the  Additional 
Protocol  to  the  Ankara  Agreement  in  2005,  Turkey 
made a declaration,
17 consisting of six articles, that it 
does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus in its current 
form, controlled by the Greek Cypriots to the exclusion 
of the Turkish Cypriots, although it accepts that the 
Greek  Cypriots  exercise  effective  control  over  the 
southern part  of the island. What Turkey does not 
recognise  is  the  Greek  Cypriot’s  claim  to  sovereignty 
over the Turkish Cypriots and over the territory of the 
entire island. This point was earlier disputed in the legal 
opinion commissioned in 1997 by the Turkish Cypriots 
                                                      
17 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 123 – 29 
July 2005, Press Statement Regarding the Additional Protocol 
to Extend the Ankara Agreement to All EU Members 
(Unofficial Translation) EUC Working Paper No. 9 
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to  contest  the  legality  of  the  Greek  Cypriots’  EU 
membership application on behalf of the entire island 
as the Republic of Cyprus.
18  
 
It was acknowledged in various quarters that Cyprus’s 
membership  of  the  EU  as  a  divided  island  with  an 
unresolved  ethno-political  conflict  was  not  only 
undesirable, but would also have a complicating effect 
on  other  issues  such  as  Turkey’s  EU  membership 
application. Nonetheless the EU has no legal provision 
that prevents the accession of states with unresolved 
territorial  conflicts.  In  practice,  the  United  Nation’s 
Annan Plan for reunifying the island was intended to 
resolve the territorial conflict, and driven partly by the 
urgency  in  preparing  for  Cyprus’s  EU  accession  as  a 
united island. The Plan, however, was rejected by the 
Greek  Cypriots  in  a  referendum,  to  the  surprise  of 
external  observers.  Because  the  government  of  the 
Republic  of  Cyprus  applied  for  EU  membership  on 
behalf of the whole island, but it joined the EU as a 
divided  island,  the  application  of  the  EU  acquis  in 
northern Cyprus is said to be suspended for the time 
being.  
 
One other precipitating factor that allowed Cyprus’s EU 
membership to proceed despite the unresolved conflict 
was  Greece’s  threat  to  veto  the  entire  2004 
enlargement  round.  In  1996,  then  Greek  Foreign 
Minister  Theodoros  Pangalos  conveyed  this  in  stark 
terms when he said that ‘if Cyprus is not admitted, then 
there will be no enlargement of the Community, and if 
there is no enlargement there will be no end to the 
negotiations  now  going  on  for  the  revision  of  the 
Treaties,  and  the  Community  will  thus  enter  into  an 
unprecedented crisis’.
19   
 
The  dynamics  surrounding  Turkey’s  quest  for  EU 
membership shifted when Cyprus was admitted as an 
EU member state in the 2004 round of enlargement, 
even  though  both  countries  submitted  their 
applications in the same year, in 1987. Some observers 
allege that the driving force behind Cyprus’s quest for 
EU membership, aside from the usual reasons proffered 
for small states that stand to benefit from its inclusion 
in the Single Market, was to gain an upper hand over 
the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in any negotiation for 
                                                      
18 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU and 
Cyprus: An Expert View Opinion of Professor M.H. 
Mendelson Q.C on the Application of “the Republic of 
Cyprus” to Join the European Union. 
19 Cyprus News, October 1996, No. 87: 3.  
conflict  resolution.
20 Nonetheless  Turkey  was  finally 
granted the official status of a EU candidate state in 
2005, though not without resistance from   some EU 
member  states  like  Germany  and  France  which 
proposed giving Turkey a ‘privileged partnership’ rather 
than full membership. 
 
As  far  as  the  technical  difficulties  and  stalemate  in 
Turkey’s EU accession negotiations are concerned, the 
problem  has  centred  on  Turkey’s  failure  to  open  its 
ports to Cyprus – an EU member state – as part of its 
obligations arising from its Customs Union agreement 
with  the  EU.  In  1987,  Turkey  closed  its  seaports  to 
vessels bearing the flag of the Republic of Cyprus, while 
civil aviation has never been initiated between the two 
countries.  In  response  to  EU  pressure,  Turkey  has 
occasionally  cited  arbitrarily  imposed  quotas  on 
Turkey’s trucking into the EU as the EU’s violation of 
the Customs Union agreement.
21 
 
Turkey’s  defence  has  been  that  the  services  sector, 
which it considers the closure of its ports to Cyprus-
flagged  vessels  to  fall  under,  is  not  included  in  the 
Customs Union agreement, whereas goods produced in 
Cyprus  are  permitted  and  have  already  entered  the 
Turkish  market.
22 Furthermore, the legal argument is 
that even if a European Court of Justice or Arbitration 
decision requires it to open its ports, Cyprus -flagged 
vessels would only be able to carry goods produced 
within the Customs Union area in their ports. With 
regard to aviation, the 1944 Chicago Convention which 
regulates  international  civil  aviation  provides  that 
scheduled flights may only be carried out between any 
two countries if an agreement is signed between them. 
Since Turkey does not even recognise the gov ernment 
of  Cyprus,  such  an  aviation  agreement  cannot  be 
signed.    
 
In relation to this issue relating to the Customs Union, 
Cyprus has been instrumental in blocking the opening 
of eight negotiation chapters for Turkish accession, as it 
did in December 2006 – the Free Movement of Goods, 
Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, 
                                                      
20 See for instance, Tocci, EU accession dynamics and conflict 
resolution.  
21 Mahir and Toygür , EU-Turkey Accession Negotiations, 
note 2 at VI.  
22Akgün, Mensur (2012) Possible scenarios in Cyprus: 
Assuming there is no solution, TESEV Publications; Ilgaz, 
Mahir and İlke Toygür (2010) EU-Turkey Accession 
Negotiations: the State of Play, IKV (Economic Development 
Foundation) Working Paper.  EUC Working Paper No. 9 
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Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External 
Relations – with the support of other EU member states. 
Consequently, the Council decided that no chapter will 
be  provisionally  closed  until  Turkey  has  fulfilled  its 
commitment in the Additional Protocol. To date, only 
the Science and Research chapter – the first chapter to 
be  opened  for  negotiations  –  has  been  concluded, 
while  12  more  chapters  had  been  opened  and  are 
pending conclusion. 
 
Turkey  cites the  continued  economic  isolation of the 
Turkish Cypriots as the reason for its intransigence on 
the  ports  issue.  Turkey's  EU  ambassador  Selim  Yenel 
called  it  ‘a  matter  of  principle’.
23 In  2004,  the  EU 
Council  of  Ministers  first  suggested  the  Direct  Trade 
Regulation  (DTR)  in  acknowledgement  of  the  Turkish 
Cypriots’  support  of  the  Annan  Plan  despite  the 
rejection of the referendum on the part of the Greek 
Cypriots. The proposal for the DTR, as prepared by the 
European  Commission, entailed  a  preferential  regime 
for  Turkish  Cypriot  goods  entering  the  EU  customs 
territory, and included the acceptance of the Turkish 
Cypriot  Chamber  of  Commerce’s  authority  to  certify 
origin.    However  this was  vetoed  by  the  Republic  of 
Cyprus  which  had  just  become  an  EU  member.  The 
Lisbon Treaty, implemented in late 2009, gave a brief 
moment of hope to proponents of the DTR as it gave 
the  European  Parliament  a  role  in  approving  trade 
agreements for the EU. However the Parliament’s Legal 
Committee ruled that the Commission could not bypass 
the  government  of  Cyprus  in  implementing  the  DTR 
with northern Cyprus. 
 
In  June  2011,  Turkey  established  a  Ministry  for  EU 
Affairs  to  take  over  the  coordination  of  Turkey’s  EU 
accession  process,  with  Egeman  Bağış,  Turkey’s  chief 
EU accession negotiator, as the Minister taking up that 
portfolio.  However,  this  has  not  had  the  effect  of 
catalysing the accession negotiations.  
 
Cyprus reunification talks 
Since the 1980s, talks on the settlement of the Cyprus 
conflict  through reunification  have  proceeded on the 
concept of a bizonal and bicommunal federal state. This 
implies  various  formulas  for  a  confederation  of  the 
Greek  Cypriot-  and  Turkish  Cypriot-held  territories, 
premised on the separate territorial and constitutional 
                                                      
23 EUobserver, ‘Turkish Cypriots fear implications of Cyprus 
EU presidency’, 21 June 2012.  
aspects  of  the  two  communities  that  would  both  be 
politically equal. This crystallised most notably in the 
United Nation’s Annan Plan, drawn up by the then UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 
 
The  referendum  on  that  Plan,  held  days  before  the 
Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the EU in 2004, was 
rejected on the Greek Cypriot side, with 75.83 per cent 
voting ‘no’ and only 24.17 per cent voting ‘yes’ . This 
meant that the Plan was deemed to have been rejected 
on  the  whole,  even  though  there  was  considerable 
support for it on the Turkish Cypriot side, with 64.91 
per cent voting ‘yes’ and 35.09 per cent voting ‘no’. The 
turn-out was high in both communities, at nearly 90 per 
cent.  Because  Cyprus’s  EU  membership  was  already 
secured when it signed the EU Treaty of Accession in 
April 2003, then Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos 
was  said  to  have  felt  unconstrained  in  outrightly 
campaigning for the rejection of the Annan Plan at the 
April 2004 referendum.
24     
 
Reunification talks restarted in 2008 with the election 
of  Demetris  Christofias  as  President  of  Cyprus,  who 
campaigned  on  a  platform  of  resolving  the  conflict 
through  a  less  uncompromising  stance  than  his 
predecessor’s. The Turkish Cypriot leader at that time, 
Mehmet Ali Talat, was similarly pro-solution, and the 
talks  were  met  with  the  support  of  Turkish  Prime 
Minister  Erdoğan.  However  these  UN-mediated  talks 
soon ran into difficulties when it became apparent that 
the  negotiating  positions  of  the  leaders  of  the  two 
communities  were  hamstrung  by  hardliners  back  in 
their respective constituencies, who were not willing to 
cede on core issues of property rights, territory, settlers 
from  Turkey,  and  citizenship.
25 As  impatience  and 
frustration grew on both sides, the political impasse 
was confirmed when Talat lost in his reelection bid in 
April  2010 to  the  hardline  candidate  Derviş  Eroğlu. 
While  Eroğlu  did  resume  talks  with  Christofias  after 
taking  office,  which  continued  into  2012  the  first 
meeting between the leaders was described as ‘low-key, 
and  business-like’,
26 while  the  negotiations  impasse 
continued.  
 
In  interviews  conducted  by  the  International  Crisis 
Group in February 2012 with senior Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish  Cypriot  officials  involved  in  the  reunification 
                                                      
24 Tocci, EU accession dynamics and conflict resolution, p.104. 
25 In view of the population transfers in 1974 in the 
aftermath of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.  
26 Morelli, Vincent (2012) Cyprus: Reunification Proving 
Elusive, Congressional Research Service, p. 7.  EUC Working Paper No. 9 
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talks, both parties spoke of failure and mutual mistrust, 
and revealed that a two-state solution was increasingly 
being discussed, breaking with the spirit of a bizonal, 
bicommunal solution of the past decades.
27 However, 
neither side wants to be seen as being responsible for a 
breakdown in the talks, and would rather wait for the 
UN to declare an end to them.
28  
 
The idea of an international conference on security 
issues surrounding Cyprus which would involve Turkey 
as one of the guarantor powers was floated in early 
2012.  This  was  met  with  objection  by  the  Greek 
Cypriots. In any case, the UN Secretary-General decided 
in  April  against  the  international  conference  as 
insufficient progress was being made in the domestic 
talks to warrant it. When the UN -mediated talks were 
downgraded from leaders’ meetings to technical level 
discussions in early May 2012, there was tellingly little 
objection from either side. At around the same time, 
Christofias acted on an earlier promise and announced 
that he was not seeking re-election in 2013, stating that 
‘there  is  no  reasonable  hope  for  a  solution  to  the 
Cyprus problem or for substantial further progress in 
the remaining months of our presidency’.
29 
 
Back in October 2011, suggestions were forwarded that 
EU should step in to revive the talks if the UN-mediated 
negotiations  were  to  indeed  fail,  but  Turkey  has 
typically objected to giving such a role to the EU in the 
negotiations.
30  This  is  ostensibly  due  to  Turkish 
perceptions that the EU cannot be an honest broker in 
such negotiations, since Cyprus is a member state of 
the Union. 
   
The rotating presidency and the Council, pre- and 
post-Lisbon Treaty  
 
The evolution of the rotating presidency 
 
The  rotating  presidency  has  been  a  feature  of  the 
European  Economic  Community  (EEC)/EU  since  the 
establishment  of  the  Council,  and  is  provided  for  by 
Article  16(9)  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union.  In 
December 2004, ‘team presidencies’ were introduced 
                                                      
27 International Crisis Group, Aphrodite’s Gift: Can Cypriot 
Gas Power a New Dialogue? Europe Report no. 216,  p. 1, 16.  
28 Akgün, Possible scenarios in Cyprus; International Crisis 
Group, Aphrodite’s Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New 
Dialogue?  
29 Cyprus Mail, ‘Christofias bows out’, May 15, 2012.  
30 Hurriyet Daily News, “Europeanize talks in Cyprus, if U.N. 
plan fails,”October 11, 2011.  
for the 2007-2020 period, in a move to improve the 
consistency of policy making that would otherwise be 
disrupted  by  changes  of  the  presidency  every  six 
months.  Under  this  new  system,  teams  of  three 
member  states  share  the  responsibilities  of  the 
presidency  for  18  months,  each  chairing  Council 
meetings for six months.  
 
The rationale for introducing the rotating presidency in 
the early days of the EEC/EU is perhaps worth revisiting 
to understand its continued use to this day. The original 
EU  members  were  broadly  of  the  view  that  a 
permanent  presidency  of  the  Council  would  create 
rivalry with the then nascent European Commission; a 
system  of  equal  rotation  among  the  governments  of 
the member states to chair the different formations of 
the Council of Ministers, regardless of the state’s size or 
merit,  was  thus  implemented.
31  This  allowed  all 
member  states  equal  access  to  the  Council,  which 
thereby evolved from a ‘fairly passive [manager]’
32 and 
mere  administrative  function  into  a  crucial  agenda 
setter,  a  promoter  of  political  initiatives,  and  a 
compromise  shaper.
33 In enabling member states  to 
make  diplomatic  contributions  independent  of  their 
political  and  economic  weight,  rotating  Council 
presidency 
 
gives us [the EU] a chance to hold an influential role 
and that you manage to get totally different people 
to look at the same issue which you move into the 
spotlight.
34  
                                                      
31 Wallace, Helen (1985) ‘The Presidency: Tasks and 
Evolution’, in C. O’Nuallain and J.-M. Hoscheidt, The 
Presidency of the European Council of Ministers; Impacts and 
Implications for National Governments (Croom Helm: 
London) p. 2.  
32 Wallace, Helen and Geoffrey Edwards (1976) ‘The evolving 
Role of the Presidency of the Council’, 52 International 
Affairs (1976) p. 536. 
33 Kirchner, Emil J. (1992) Decision-making in the European 
Community – The Council Presidency and European 
Integration (Manchester University Press: Manchester); 
Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona and Helen Wallace (1995) ‘Executive 
Power in the European Union: The Functions and Limits of 
the Council Ministers’, 2 Journal of European Public Policy, 
pp. 559-582; Sherrington, Philippa (2002) The Council of 
Ministers – Political Authority in the European Union (Pinter: 
London). 
34 Greek official, European Parliament (26 April 2004), cited in 
Simone Bunse, Paul Magnette and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2005) 
"Shared Leadership in the EU: Theory and Reality', in D. 
Curtin, A. E. Kellermann, and S. Blockmans(eds) (2005) The 
EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? (T.M.C. Asser 
Press: The Hague), at note 21.  EUC Working Paper No. 9 
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Nonetheless  the  Lisbon  Treaty  introduced  a  hybrid 
system  combining  a  rotating  presidency  with  the 
establishment  of  a  permanent  President  for  the 
European Council, when it was felt that this would help 
provide  more  continuity  in  EU  policymaking.  While 
some  believe  that  the  political  dimension  of  the 
rotating presidency has been ‘seriously limited, if not 
eradicated’,
35 others believe it is ‘in fact here to stay, 
albeit  in  a  different  form’.
36 Whereas  the  head  of 
government of the member state holding the rotating 
presidency in the pre-Lisbon Treaty era used to be the 
‘face’ of the Council and perhaps even the entire EU,
37 
then  Spanish  Prime  Minister  José  Luis  Rodríguez 
Zapatero  exuded  a  sense  of  detachment  from  his 
country’s  rotating  presidency,  held  after  the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.
38 The President of 
the European Council, together with the new position 
of  the  High  Representative  for  Foreign  Affairs  and 
Security Policy currently held by Catherine Ashton, have 
been said to render the prime minister (or president) 
and foreign minister of the rotating presidency member 
state ‘virtually jobless’.
39 
 
This is not entirely accurate, since the Lisbon Treaty is 
ambiguous  on  how  the  rotating  member  state 
presidency of the Council is to function in tandem with 
the President of the European Council and other actors 
under  this  new  hybrid  system.  The  Spanish  and  the 
Belgian presidencies, the first two presidencies to take 
place  after  the  implementation  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty, 
saw  two  very  different  models  of  working,  which 
obviated  the  establishment  of  a  blueprint  for 
cooperation between the rotating presidency and the 
permanent  President.
40 Some expect that it will take 
                                                      
35 Kaczyński, Piotr Maciej (2011) ‘What is left for the rotating 
presidency after the Lisbon rules?’ in The 2011 Think Global 
Act European (TGAE) Report, Notre Europe.   
36 Missiroli, Antonio and Janis Emmanouilidis (2009) 
Implementing Lisbon: the EU Presidency's other (rotating) 
half, European Policy Centre (EPC) Policy Brief, p. 1.  
37 Most notably in recent years, then French President 
Nicholas Sarkozy’s brokering of the ceasefire between Russia 
and Georgia during the August 2008 hostilities between 
those two countries, in his capacity as head of 
government/state of the rotating EU presidency.  
38 Although some of the subsequent heads of government of 
the rotating presidency were very much in the limelight such 
as the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (in the January 
to June 2011 period), albeit for reasons pertaining more to 
the spotlighting of Hungary’s media laws.  
39 Missiroli and Emmanouilidis, Implementing Lisbon, p. 2.  
40 Kaczyński, Piotr Maciej (2011)  How to assess a rotating 
presidency of the Council under the Lisbon rules – the case of 
the  period  of  Herman  Van  Rompuy’s  first  term  as 
President  of  the  European  Council,  which  expired  in 
mid-2012, for practices in the post-Lisbon institutional 
system  to  be  consolidated.
41 Van Rompuy has  since 
been chosen for a second term to last until the end of 
2014.  
 
The Council of the European Union 
 
The Council is constituted by the ministers of each EU 
member state, and is the legislature of the EU along 
with the European Parliament. It is a single institution 
but meets in different configurations, each attended by 
the  member  state  minister/s  and  the  European 
Commissioner/s  responsible  for  the  policy  areas  as 
delineated.  Nonetheless  any  Council  decision  is 
adopted as a whole body, rather than by its separate 
configurations.  The  number  of  configurations  within 
the Council has fluctuated over the years – there are 
currently ten since the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
 
The  General  Affairs  Council,  which  deals  with  issues 
that cut across more than one policy area such as that 
of  EU enlargement,  and  the  other  configurations  are 
chaired  by  the  rotating  presidency.  The  exception  to 
this is the Foreign Affairs Council, which is chaired by 
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, as provided for by the Lisbon Treaty in a move to 
ensure coherence in the EU’s external action.  
 
Four key roles are commonly ascribed to the rotating 
president  of  the  Council  –  that  of  a  manager  that 
coordinates and chairs Council meetings; a mediator or 
broker that seeks to build consensus in agreements; a 
leader that promotes political initiatives and priorities; 
and that of an internal and external representative of 
the Council.
42 While the bulk of the literature on the 
roles of the rotating presidency  comes from the pre-
Lisbon Treaty era, the categorisation of these roles still 
applies in the post-Lisbon Treaty era, albeit in modified 
intensities.  
 
                                                                                            
Hungary, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Policy 
Brief, p. 4.  
41 Missiroli and Emmanouilidis, p. 2.   
42 Quaglia, Lucia and Moxon-Browne, Edward (2006) ‘What 
makes a good EU Presidency? Italy and Ireland compared’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 2: 377-95, p. 351; 
Tallberg, Jonas (2003) ‘The agenda-shaping powers of the. EU 
Council Presidency’, Journal of European Public Policy 10:1 
February 2003: 1–19, p. 2.  EUC Working Paper No. 9 
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Turkey, as a non-member state, does not sit on Council 
meetings.  As  an  EU  candidate  country,  Turkey’s 
relations with  the  EU  fall  mainly  under  enlargement, 
which  is  not  a  single-issue  policy  but  a  ‘composite 
policy’.
43 There is no ‘enlargement Council’ in the way 
there  is  a  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Council,  because 
enlargement  policy  is  in  fact  about  facilitating  the 
implementation  of  the  whole  range  of  EU  policies  – 
through the adoption of the acquis communautaire – in 
the candidate state. As far as accession negotiations are 
concerned,  this  means  that  the  respective  Council 
configurations  deal  with  Turkey  on  the  basis  of  the 
negotiation chapter of the acquis in question. The nitty-
gritty  procedures  of  accession  negotiations  are 
conducted by European Commission officials, which the 
Turkish  officials  have  emphasized  that  they  will 
continue  to  keep  contact  with  during  the  Cyprus 
presidency.  Nonetheless  the  general  direction  of 
enlargement policy is expressly under the purview of 
the General Affairs Council, the Council configuration 
that is still chaired by the rotating presidency. With the 
curtailment of the political dimension of the rotating 
presidency  given  the  changes  brought  about  by  the 
Lisbon  Treaty,  the  Council  has  been  described  to  be 
now  left  to  managing  ongoing  legislation  with  the 
European Parliament.
44 This implies a reduction, though 
not  the  complete  cessation,  of  the  external 
representative role of the Council. 
 
The need for the Cyprus presidency as an external 
representative of the EU to be in close contact with 
Turkey as a third country has thus correspondingly 
diminished. Therefore when Turkey says that it will not 
attend meetings chaired by the Cyprus presidency, in 
enacting the boycott, this in fact refers to very few 
meetings. Moreover in the post-Lisbon Treaty era, the 
higher level external meetings of the Council would be 
taken over by the Pres ident of the European Council 
and, where external relations are concerned, by the 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy.  
 
EU enlargement agenda of the Cyprus presidency  
 
The agenda set by the rotating presidencies depend on 
the level of ambition of the member state in question, 
                                                      
43 Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2005) ‘Eastern enlargement – towards 
a European EU?’ in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark 
A. Pollack (eds) Policy-making in the European Union (OUP: 
Oxford) p. 402  
44 Kaczyński, How to assess a rotating presidency of the 
Council under the Lisbon rules, p. 1.  
although they are now made to coordinate this with 
their ‘team presidency’ counterparts for the 18 month 
period.  The  agenda  of  the  presidencies  regarding  EU 
enlargement, at least the post-Lisbon ones, have been 
fairly standard if unimaginative. This generally means 
carrying on the accession negotiations from the point 
left behind by the preceding presidency. With regard to 
the Cyprus presidency, this means that pushing on with 
the accession negotiations with Turkey is officially on its 
agenda, which states that  
 
[…]  the  reinforcement  of  Turkey’s  accession 
prospect is of critical importance and the Presidency 
will focus on advancing this prospect, in line with 
Turkey’s  Negotiating  Framework  and  relevant 
Council conclusions.
45 
 
In practice however, the Cypriot Foreign Minister Erato 
Kozakou-Marcoullis,  in  her  capacity  as  chair  of  the 
General Affairs Council, has spoken of using Turkey’s EU 
accession ‘not only as a carrot but also as a stick’ for 
breaking  Turkey’s  ‘intransigence’  on  issues  in  the 
reunification  talks.  Meanwhile  Marcoullis  has  been 
actively  pushing  for  Serbia’s  and  Albania’s  respective 
paths towards EU membership during a tour of South 
East  Europe.
46 But it would be difficult to restart the 
accession negotiations with Turkey anyway, whichever 
EU member state was holding the rotating presidency 
at this time. The reasons for some EU member states in 
resisting  Turkey’s  EU  membership  are,  however, 
beyond the scope of this article.   
 
Over the years, Greek Cypriot officials tend to indicate 
tacit  support  for  Turkey’s  EU  membership,  though  a 
plan for overcoming Cyprus-Turkey differences has not 
been forthcoming.  
 
Analysis of the Turkish boycott of the Cyprus 
presidency  
 
On the one hand, the ‘suspension of a practically non-
existent  relationship’
47  between  Turkey  and  the 
Republic of Cyprus does not seem to be a cause for 
alarm.  The  Turkish  EU  affairs  minister  Egemen  Bağış 
                                                      
45 Cyprus EU Presidency Secretariat, Programme of the 
Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 1 
July - 31 December 2012, p. 10.   
46 Evripidou, Stefanos, ‘Cyprus hopes for Serbia accession 
talks to begin’, Cyprus Mail, 8 August 2012; Cyprus Mail,  
‘Marcoullis encourages Albania on EU membership’, 2 August 
2012.  
47 Akgün, Possible scenarios in Cyprus, p. 4.  EUC Working Paper No. 9 
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himself had unambiguously pointed out that ‘we don’t 
have any relations with the Greek Cypriot side anyway, 
we don't recognise them, so we have no ties’.
48 On the 
other hand, the fact that such a state of mutual non-
recognition  between  an  EU  member  state  and  a 
candidate  state  is  now  presented  as  a  boycott of an 
integral  EU  institution  only  cements  the  deadlock  in 
two major intertwined issues – Turkey’s EU accession 
and the settlement of the Cyprus conflict – that have 
dragged  on  for  decades.  It  is  worrying  that  such 
freezing of ties at this late stage of EU-Turkey relations 
and  of  the  settlement  efforts  in  the  Cyprus  conflict 
would  ‘deepen  the  gap  between  the  two  parties’,
49 
thereby  dampening  the  will  of  all  parties  to  work 
towards any solution again.  
 
The Cyprus EU presidency could have acted as a spur 
for the reunification of Cyprus under the UN-mediated 
talks, and was indeed presented as an opportunity for a 
united Cyprus to hold that role. The 1 July 2012 date 
was  seen  by  outsiders  of  the  conflict  as  a  ‘natural 
deadline’
50  for  the  talks.  Turkey  and  the  Turkish 
Cypriots  expressed  interest  in  this  possibility,  though 
not the Greek Cypriots. As the date drew nearer and it 
became  more  apparent  that  the  reunification  talks 
were stalling, Turkey’s encouragement of a presidency 
to be held by a united Cyprus morphed into a threat of 
boycotting the Cyprus presidency. Ostensibly it was just 
another option for Ankara to inject a sense of urgency 
into the negotiations by applying pressure to the Greek 
Cypriots and the EU. This suggests that the option of 
Ankara  boycotting  the  Cypriot  presidency  had  been 
added  to  its  repertoire  of  signalling  with  regard  to 
pushing for a resolution of the Cyprus conflict, albeit 
with no results. 
 
On the whole, the indication is that Ankara’s decision to 
boycott the Cyprus EU presidency is in fact a measured 
diplomatic  act,  contrary  to  the  occasionally 
sensationalist media reportage. As cited above, Turkish 
diplomats  have  shown  they  understood  that  the 
changes  which  the  Lisbon  Treaty  brought  to  the 
functioning of the European Council and Council of the 
European  Union  meant  that  the  rotating  presidency 
now  had  a  reduced  role  and,  arguably,  a  reduced 
political status. Additionally, Turkish officials had taken 
great care to emphasize that relations with all other EU 
                                                      
48 EurActiv, ‘Turkey warns of freezing ties with Cyprus EU 
Presidency’, 14 July 2011. 
49 Akgün, Possible scenarios in Cyprus, p. 4.   
50 See for instance, International Crisis Group, Aphrodite’s 
Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue?  
bodies like the European Commission and the European 
Parliament  would  continue  as  normal,  and  that 
Turkey’s  EU  accession  negotiations  should  be  a 
separate  matter  from  Cyprus-related  issues.  While 
Turkey’s boycott of a key EU institution – that is the 
rotating  Council  presidency  –  might  come  across  a 
controversial act, Turkey could always retort that there 
had  been  more  controversial  incidents  in  EU-Cyprus 
matters, such as the Cyprus’s accession to the EU as a 
divided  island  when  the  Greek  Cypriots  rejected  the 
Annan Plan.      
 
But  it  should  be  noted  too  that  Turkish  opinion  on 
northern Cyprus is hardly a unified one, and neither is 
the Turkish Cypriot opinion always aligned with Ankara. 
Some quarters in the Turkish leadership are believed to 
be  keen  to  extricate  themselves  from  Turkey’s 
commitments in making transfer payments to northern 
Cyprus,  which  was  especially  a  burden  during  the 
Turkish  financial  recession  of  2001.
51 It also belies a 
simplistic  reading  –  predominantly  from  the  Greek 
Cypriot side – that northern Cyprus is merely a ‘puppet 
state’  of  Turkey,  if  one  considers  the  spectrum  of 
political opinion found in Turkish Cypriot politics. 
 
The external role of the rotating Council presidency has 
been  marginalised  by  the  provisions  of  the  Lisbon 
Treaty  which  had  restructured  the  external  action 
functions  of  the  EU,  so  it  might  be  argued  that  any 
contact between Cyprus and Turkey as a third country 
would have been minimal even if no boycott took place.  
 
The  real  issue  that  should  be  of  concern  is  how  the 
triangle of EU-Turkey-Cyprus relations will pan out in 
the  long  term.  Turkey’s  boycott  of  the  Cyprus 
presidency is only one of many ‘diplomatic incidents’ in 
the  chequered  history  of  the  Cyprus  conflict.  Of 
particular concern at the present time is the erosion of 
Demetris Christofias’s standing in Greek Cypriot politics. 
He  has  been  the  most  pro-reunification  president 
Cyprus has had, but his failure at the UN-mediated talks 
and his recent decision not to seek reelection are likely 
to pave the way at the polls for a successor who would 
be less compromising in any reunification attempt. The 
next milestone in the Cyprus talks would be the 2013 
presidential election in Cyprus, before which no new 
development on reunification talks is expected.    
 
Meanwhile those with the most to lose are perhaps the 
Turkish  Cypriots.  If  the  two-state  solution  that  is 
increasingly  being  promoted  becomes  the  accepted 
                                                      
51 Tocci, EU accession dynamics and conflict resolution, p. 98.  EUC Working Paper No. 9 
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outcome, the Turkish Cypriots will likely remain in their 
current  state  of  economic  and  diplomatic  isolation. 
Osman Ertuğ, the Turkish Cypriot chief negotiator in the 
UN  talks,  has  suggested  that  while  the  Cyprus  EU 
presidency  only  last  six  months,  the  recent 
developments would only ‘cement the status quo’ and 
‘boost  the  self-confidence  of  the  other  [i.e.  Greek 
Cypriot] side’.
52 
 
Conclusion 
 
While  Turkish  officials  have  strongly  asserted  their 
decision to boycott the Cyprus Council presidency on 
several  occasions,  this  stems  more  from  a  bind 
whereby it does not want to accord recognition to what 
it calls the Greek Cypriot administration of the Republic 
of Cyprus, which the act of Turkish officials attending 
meetings  chaired  by  the  Greek  Cypriots  would 
ostensibly entail. This was itself a spin-off from the tit-
for-tat retaliatory action between Cyprus and Turkey on 
issues  relating  to  the  blocking  of  negotiations  for 
Turkish EU accession and the Cyprus reunification talks. 
Tellingly  too,  Turkey  had  changed  its  tone  from 
encouraging the reunification of Cyprus by the time of 
the  Cyprus  presidency  to  a  threat  of  boycott  of  the 
presidency at  the  point when  the  UN-mediated talks 
were  clearly  stalling.  This  suggests  that  the  boycott 
threat was calculated to inject urgency into the talks. 
The  suspension  of  a  non-existent  diplomatic 
relationship  between  Turkey  and  the  Republic  of 
Cyprus  might  be  a  non-issue,  but  the  fact  that  such 
difficulties have dragged on so late in the timescale of 
EU-Turkey-Cyprus relations suggests that the status quo 
is likely to be cemented. 
 
 
 
                                                      
52 EUobserver, ‘Turkish Cypriots fear implications of Cyprus 
EU presidency’, 21 June 2012. EUC Working Paper No. 9 
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